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Abstract 
 
In 1994 the Federal Reserve System moved to a more transparent reporting of monetary 
policy. In this paper we first discuss the evolution of Federal Reserve transparency in 
U.S. and second we test its effectiveness.  We assess the empirical impact of monetary 
policy transparency on the uncertainty about future monetary policy using T-bill rate 
forecast dispersions from the Survey of Professional Forecasters as a proxy for monetary 
policy uncertainty.  We use three statistical methodologies: descriptive statistics, single 
regression equations and a vector autoregressive model. The empirical findings confirm 
that Federal Reserve transparency has reduced the uncertainty of future monetary policy 
anticipated by market participants. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Chairman Greenspan (2004) in his address to the American Economic Association 
argued that the Federal Reserve’s experiences over the past two decades” make it clear 
that uncertainty is not just a pervasive feature of the monetary policy landscape; it is the 
defining characteristic of the landscape” (Greenspan (2004, p.36)).  Further elaborating 
the notion of monetary policy under uncertainty, at the Fourth Conference on the 
International Research Forum on Monetary Policy, Vice Chairman of the Federal Reserve 
Board of Governors Donald L. Kohn (2006) discussed in detail the role of uncertainty 
and its influence on the formulation of monetary policy.   
    In this paper we discuss (1) how the Federal Reserve Bank under the Chairmanship of 
Alan Greenspan took several initiatives to reduce uncertainty about future monetary 
policy by becoming more transparent.  We, then (2) assess the empirical impact of 
monetary policy transparency on the uncertainty about future monetary policy using T-
bill rate forecast dispersions from the Survey of Professional Forecasters as a proxy for 
monetary policy uncertainty. 
 
2. Central Bank Transparency 
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In view of the fact that the Fed has been given enormous economic responsibilities to 
preserve price stability and promote economic growth, the question naturally arises as to 
how the Fed should exercise its responsibilities in a democratic society guided by 
institutions of freedom and accountability. Academic economists and policy makers 
agree that the Fed’s accountability for its actions to preserve low inflation and promote 
economic growth is best expressed in its degree of transparency. 
     The standard definition of transparency is the commitment of the Central Bank to 
provide reliable, complete, and timely information to the widest possible audience.  A 
more theoretical definition of transparency that is widely used in the literature is the lack 
of asymmetric information between monetary policy makers and economic agents. This 
is equivalent to saying that transparency describes the presence of symmetry of 
information between policy makers and economic agents. 
     Transparency has multiple attributes each of which is essential to maintaining the 
meaning of the concept. Thus failure to provide information, providing unreliable 
information, providing it in an untimely way, or providing information that is abstruse or 
difficult to understand violates the integrity of the concept. These issues are discussed in 
detail in Ferguson (2001), Carpenter (2004), Issing (2005) Haan et al (2007). 
    Historically speaking, transparency as it relates to monetary policies of the Federal 
Reserve and Central Banks around the world was not a top priority.  In fact for a long 
time, the actions, policies and objectives of central banks were shrouded in secrecy. The 
change in approach is due in part to the recognition by central bankers of the economic 
benefits of more transparency about the design, procedures, and tools employed in 
carrying out the policies.    
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      In the U.S, there has been an evolution in the practice of transparency at the Federal 
Reserve.  This evolution can be separated into two multiple dimensions. With regard to 
transparency concerning policy objectives, the road began with the Freedom of 
Information Act, which took effect in 1967. As a result of this act, FOMC began to 
publish the proceeding of the minutes of the Fed meetings. However, the minutes were 
divided into two documents. One was called the Memorandum of Discussion, which was 
released after a five-year lag. This document identified the speakers and contributors, but 
was not a verbatim transcript. The other was a shorter document called the Record of 
Policy Action, which was released with relatively little delay. This document provided a 
summary of the committee’s deliberation and discussion but did not identify which 
FOMC member took which position. 
     In 1979, in response to a court suit challenging the legality of delay of the release of 
the Memorandum, the FOMC discontinued its publication. The FOMC continues to 
publish the Record of Policy Action but in 1993 changed its name to “Minutes of FOMC 
Meetings.” Over time, the release lag of this document was shortened and currently is 
available two days after the next scheduled FOMC meeting. 
     Transparency of FOMC with respect to policy actions has improved considerably over 
the past 10 years. Beginning in 1994, under the leadership of Chairman Alan Greenspan, 
the Federal Reserve System went through a series of changes in the reporting of monetary 
policy. Prior to February 1994, financial market participants had to guess, infer or 
estimate the current target of the Federal funds rate as well as the likely future path of 
monetary policy. A number of economists, some of whom had previously worked for the 
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Federal Reserve System worked as “Fed Watchers” with the task of divining monetary 
policy.  
     Starting in February 1994, the post FOMC meeting press releases began to signal 
changes in the Federal funds rate target without explicitly stating the target. When no 
post meeting statement was released this was taken to signal no change in the Fed funds 
target. 
     Beginning with the July 1995 FOMC meeting the Fed began to explicitly state the Fed 
funds target. Starting with the May 1999 FOMC meeting, in addition to the Fed funds 
target announcement, the post meeting statements began to include the reasoning behind 
the target level as well as an indication of the expected future path of the Federal funds 
rate. A detailed historical analysis of the evolution of central bank transparency in the 
U.S. is found in Poole (2005a), Carlson et al (2006) and Moskow (2006).  
3. Empirical Assessment of Impact of Monetary Policy Transparency 
Having briefly discussed the concept of transparency and its recent evolution in the U.S. 
we next investigate empirically its impact.  There is only a small set of empirical papers 
since the implementation of Fed transparency is only about 12 years old. Carpenter 
(2004) reviews few of these empirical studies. 
     In our empirical investigation, as a proxy for the various sources of uncertainty about 
future monetary policy we use the forecast dispersions for T-bills from the Survey of 
Professional Forecasters (SPF). We use these data for three reasons.  
     First, since the T-bill rate closely tracks the Federal funds rate, it seems plausible that 
forecasters of the T-bill rate are essentially attempting to forecast future monetary policy. 
Figure 1 shows the close relationship (correlation = 0.996) between the Federal funds rate 
 4
and the three-month T-bill rate since 1981. Clearly movements in the T-bill rate closely 
track the Federal funds rate. Hence we assume that forecasters of the future T-bill rate are 
influenced in large degree by what they think the Fed is going to do with future monetary 
policy. 
     The second reason is that survey based forecasts predict well. Ang, Bekaert and Wei 
(2006) provide detailed evidence about the relative performance of four alternative 
methods of forecasting out-of-sample inflation in the U.S.: time series ARIMA models, 
regressions using Phillips curve modeling, term structure models that include linear, 
nonlinear and arbitrage-free modeling and survey-based measures. They find that survey 
forecasts outperform the other econometric methods.   
     The third reason we use T-bill data is that the Survey of Professional Forecasters 
provides data on forecasts on the future three month T-bill rate. Calculating the forecast 
dispersion, (i.e. the standard deviation of these forecasts across forecasters) provides us 
with a proxy for uncertainty about future monetary policy. The SPF is conducted by the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. The data is available on their web site (see 
http://www.phil.frb.org/econ/spf/index.html). 
     Since the third quarter of 1981, after the release of the advance NIPA data for 
previous quarter, that is in the beginning of February, May, August, and November, the 
SPF has asked a group of about 30 to 50 people who make a living as forecasters on Wall 
Street or in business for their forecast of the three month T-bill rate one to five quarters 
into the future.  Using these forecasts from each, we proxy for uncertainty about future 
monetary policy as the standard deviation of these T-bill rate forecasts one to five 
quarters ahead ( ) by calculating: jtSTF
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where  is the three month T-bill forecast of forecaster i, in quarter t and is 
the mean forecast for quarter t and for both j = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 quarters ahead.  The number 
of forecasters each quarter is  which varies from around 30 to 50 people. The 
hypothesis we wish to test is: Fed transparency reduces the standard deviation of T-bill 
rate forecasts.  We employ three methodologies: descriptive statistics, single equation 
regression and vector autoregressions. 
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Descriptive statistics 
Figure 2 shows the standard deviation of T-bill rate forecasts, our measure of forecast 
dispersion, one to five quarters ahead from the Survey of Professional Forecasters. For 
the aid of comparison the scale of the vertical axis of each graph is identical. Two things 
can be noted from figure 2. First, note that the standard deviation of forecasts was 
relatively higher in the early 1980s. Second, notice that the standard deviation of 
forecasts increases as the forecast horizon increases from two to five quarters ahead. 
     As can be seen in figure 2 a lot of the volatility in the forecast dispersion occurs in the 
early 1980s, although this is less true for the four to five quarters ahead forecasts than the 
nearer term forecasts. Some of the volatility in the forecast dispersion perhaps can be 
attributed to the transition to lower inflation following the recessions of the 1980 and 
1981-82.  By the end of 1983 inflation had stabilized around 4% and we take this to be 
the end of the “first” transition to lower inflation. 
     Table 1 reports the mean of the forecast dispersions for the sample split according to 
the evolution of the transparency of monetary policy. The differences in the mean 
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dispersions (tests not reported) are all statistically significantly different from the 1981:3 
to 1993:4 pre-transparency sample as well as from the 1984:1 to 1993:4 sample. Also the 
changes in the mean dispersions are quite large. As shown in the table below the decline 
in the mean dispersion is between 25 and 50 percent. The second row of numbers uses 
the sample 1984:1 to 1993:4 as the “pre-transparency” period. 
     As discussed above during the sample period the intention of monetary policy makers 
was to increasingly make monetary policy more transparent. If the Fed has gotten better 
at communicating its intentions, then there should be a greater consensus on the path of 
future monetary policy and hence lower forecast dispersions on average. Hence to the 
extent that the Fed was successful at increasing transparency, the goal of which 
presumably is to reduce the uncertainty about monetary policy, the forecast dispersions 
should decrease.  This indeed seems to be the case. Figure 2 and Table 1 both indicate 
that going from the 1980s into the 1990s and 2000s forecast dispersion has decreased.  
     Table 3 isolates spikes in the forecast dispersions. Spikes in the forecast dispersions 
are identified as values of STF1, STF2, STF3, STF4, or STF5 greater than or equal to 
their means plus one standard deviation. Table 3 reports the dates and magnitudes of the 
spikes. For the 91 quarters from 1984:1 to 2006:3 there are 34 quarters where at least one 
forecast dispersion spikes. In only two quarter do all five spike while in 13 quarters only 
one forecast dispersion spikes. With the exception of STF4, all forecast dispersions spike 
the between 13 and 17 times. Some of these spikes can be associated with changes in the 
stance of monetary policy and some with financial or political events.   
     Hence while the data plot and sample statistics alone suggests that the Fed has been 
successful at reducing uncertainty about future monetary policy the empirical question is 
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what else might account for the decline in forecast dispersion other than the increase in 
the transparency of monetary policy. Table 3 suggests it is necessary to control for that 
the absolute size of the changes in the Federal funds and the occurrence of financial 
crises when estimating the impact of transparency on the forecast dispersion of T-bill. 
Single Equation Regression Models 
     To estimate the impact of increased transparency on the market participant uncertainty 
about future monetary policy the following regression is estimated: 
(2) 
ttttt
tkktjt
NINERUSSIANASIANCRASH
FFRDDFFRSTF
εββββ
ββββ
+++++
Δ×++Δ+=
1187                             7654
3210  
Right hand side variables are defined as follows: tFFRΔ  is the absolute value of the 
change in the Federal funds rate from the previous quarter.  for k = 94, 95, 99 is a 
dummy variable that equals 1 beginning in 1994:1, 1995:4 and 1999:3 respectively and 
zero otherwise. Hence tracks the changes in the transparency of monetary policy. 
 is a dummy for the 1987 stock market crash and equals 1 for 1987:4 and zero 
otherwise.  is the dummy for the Asian financial crisis and equals 1 for 1997:3 
and zero otherwise.  is the dummy for the Russian/LTCM financial crisis and 
equals 1 for 1998:4 and zero otherwise.  is the dummy for 9/11 and equals 1 for 
2001:4 and zero otherwise 
kD
kD
tCRASH87
tASIAN
tRUSSIAN
tNINE11
     Estimates of equation (2) are reported in table 4 for the 1 to 5 quarter ahead forecast 
dispersions of the 3 month T-bill rate. In discussing the results we first focus on the 
control variables and then the transparency variables. 
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     Tables 4a to 4e report that the coefficient on the absolute value of the change in the 
Federal funds rate is statistically significant for all regressions for , for j = 1 to 4 
and the 2 out of the 6 specifications for . The coefficients indicate that a 100 basis 
point change in the Federal funds rate increase the one quarter ahead forecast dispersion 
 by 9 to 14 basis points or equivalently 50% to 70% of the sample mean for . 
A similar magnitude result is obtained for the 2 quarter ahead forecast dispersion . 
For the 3, 4 and 5 quarter ahead forecast dispersions, a 100 basis point change in the 
Federal funds rate results in an in forecast dispersions equivalent 30% to 50% of their 
sample means. These results indicate rather robustly that changes in the Federal funds 
rate generate statistically significant and large (relative to the sample mean) increases in 
forecast dispersion and hence uncertainty about future monetary policy. In addition the 
results indicate that the changes in the Federal funds rate generate more uncertainty 1 to 2 
quarters ahead than 3 to 5 quarters ahead. One way to think about the goal of making 
monetary policy more transparent is that the Fed wants to reduce the impact of that 
changes in the Federal funds rate have on uncertainty about future monetary policy.  
jtSTF
tSTF5
tSTF1 tSTF1
tSTF2
     Tables 4a to 4e also report the coefficients on the various financial/political crisis 
variables. The coefficients for the 1987 stock market crash suggest that the crash 
increased forecast dispersions of the T bill rate for 1 quarter ahead  by 73% to 100% of its 
sample mean, while the 2 quarter ahead T bill rate forecast dispersion increase 63% to 
83% of its sample mean. All the 87CRASH coefficients are statistically significant in the 
 regressions while 2 out of 3 are in the  regression. For the 3, 4 and 5 quarter 
ahead forecast dispersions the 87CRASH coefficients indicate a 35% to 72% increase in 
forecast dispersion. However these coefficients are not statistically significant. Hence the 
tSTF2 tSTF1
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1987 stock market crash did increase forecast dispersion for the T-bill rate. Further the 
increase in forecast dispersion was large, between 35% and 100% of the forecast 
dispersion sample mean depending on the regression, however the coefficients are only 
statistically significant for  (2 out of 3 regressions) and . tSTF1 tSTF2
     The Asian financial crisis resulted in a very large and statistically significant increase 
in the 1 quarter forecast dispersion : 373% to 400% of the sample mean.  tSTF1
For the 2 quarter ahead forecast dispersion the results are mixed: in two specifications the 
impact is small and statistically insignificant while in one specification (which controls 
only for the 1999 changes in monetary policy transparency) the impact of the crisis is 
large (237% of the sample mean) and statistically significant. For the rest of the forecast 
dispersions the impact of the Asian crisis is small and statistically insignificant. Both the 
Russian financial crisis and 9/11 have a statistically insignificant impact on the T bill 
forecast dispersions at all horizons. That the 1987 crash had the biggest impact on 
forecast dispersion followed by the 1997 Asian financial crisis and given that the 1998 
Russian/LTCM crisis and 9/11/2001 have essentially no impact on forecast dispersion is 
consistent with monetary policy transparency reducing the impact on external shocks on 
the short debt market.  
     Now we will discuss our estimated impact of transparency on the T bill forecast 
dispersions. Table 4a to 4e report the coefficients on the transparency dummies,  for k 
= 94, 95, 99 as well as the interaction of the dummies with the absolute value of the 
change in the Federal funds rate, 
kD
tk FFRD Δ×  for k = 94, 95, 99. 
     For the 1 quarter ahead forecast dispersion,  the coefficients on  for k = 94, 
95, 99 not controlling for financial crises (Table 4a, column 2, 4, and 6) suggest a 
tSTF1 kD
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reduction in forecast dispersion of -7, -6 and -7 basis points respectively with only first 
estimate being statistically significant. Controlling for financial crises (Table 4a, column 
3, 5, and 7), the coefficients on   for k = 94, 95, 99 suggest a reduction in forecast 
dispersion of -10, -8 and -4 basis points with the first two estimates being statistically 
significant. This suggests the introduction of transparency resulted in a reduction the 
average forecast dispersion by about -20% to -50% of the sample mean. The coefficients 
on the interaction term 
kD
tk FFRD Δ×  for k = 94, 95, 99 are all positive but statistically 
insignificant. Hence for the 1 quarter ahead forecast dispersions there evidence that the 
changes in the transparency of monetary policy resulted in a large reduction in the 
average level of forecast dispersion, with essentially no change in the response of forecast 
dispersion to change in the Federal funds rate.  
     Tables 4b and 4c give the results for the 2 and 3 quarter ahead forecast dispersions. 
The results are similar to the 1 quarter forecast dispersions: the coefficients on  for k = 
94, 95, 99 not controlling for financial crises (Table 4b and 4c, column 2, 4, and 6) 
suggest a reduction in forecast dispersion of -9, -6 and +1 basis points respectively for 
 and -9, -10 and +1 reduction in forecast dispersion for . The first two 
estimates for both  and  are also statistically significant. In terms of the 
sample means the reduction in the forecast dispersion is approximately -20% to -30% for 
the 2 quarter ahead forecast dispersion  and approximately -21% to-23% for the 
three quarter ahead forecast dispersion . Similar results are obtained with the 
regressions that include the controls for financial/political crises. The coefficients on the 
interaction term 
kD
tSTF2 tSTF3
tSTF2 tSTF3
tSTF2
tSTF3
tk FFRD Δ×  for k = 94, 95, 99 in both the and  regressions tSTF2 tSTF3
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are negative which is consistent with increased transparency reducing uncertainty but 
statistically insignificant.  
     The results for the 4 and 5 quarter ahead forecast dispersions, given in Tables 4d and 
4e indicate a reduction in forecast dispersions by -4% to -32%. However none of the 
estimates are statistically significantly different from zero. The same is true for 
coefficients on the interaction term tk FFRD Δ×  for k = 94, 95, 99.  
     In summary, the biggest impact of the change in monetary policy transparency 
occurred in 1994 and 1995: the forecast dispersions decreased by -20% to -30% of the 
sample mean for the 1, 2 and 3 quarter ahead T bill forecasts. The range of the decrease 
in forecast dispersions is similar for the 4 and 5 quarter ahead forecast dispersions, 
although the estimates are not statistically significant. Thus our estimates suggest that 
controlling for financial/political crisis and the absolute value of the change in the 
Federal funds rate, the changes in monetary policy transparency introduced in 1994 and 
19995 resulted in a large reduction in uncertainty about future monetary policy 1 to 3 
quarters into the future. In other words the hypothesis claiming that central bank 
transparency has reduced future uncertainty about monetary policy cannot be rejected.  
Vector Autoregressions 
This section uses structural vector autoregressions (SVAR) to characterize the dynamic 
impact of economic and monetary policy on the T-bill rate forecast dispersion. SVARs 
have been used extensively in the empirical monetary policy literature (see for example 
Bernanke and Mihov (1998)).  
     The SVARs are estimated using quarterly data from 1981:3 to 2006:3. The general 
specification of the structural form of the models is given by: 
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 (3)  ttt XLBAX ε+= −1)(  
where,  is an n x 1 vector of endogenous variables, A is n x n parameter matrix with 
ones on the main diagonal and the off diagonal elements capturing the contemporaneous 
relationships between the variables, B(L) is a polynomial matrix in the lag operator, and 
tX
tε  is an n x 1 vector of structural shocks. The standard or reduced forms VAR is given by 
(4)  ttt XLDX μ+= −1)(  
 
where  and . Given estimates of the forecast errors of the 
standard form VAR 
)()( 1 LBALD −= tt A εμ 1−=
tμ , a necessary condition for identification of the structural shocks, 
tε  can be obtained by imposing n(n-1)/2  restrictions on the A matrix (see Enders (1995) 
or Hamilton (1994)). The endogenous variable vector is given by 
. The variable  is the growth rate from the same quarter 
of the pervious year of the consumption expenditure price excluding energy and food,  
[ jttttt STFFFRUINFX ,,,=′ ] tINF
tU
is the unemployment rate and is the effective Federal funds rate. The data for these 
three variables comes from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis: 
tFFR
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/.   The structural shocks are given as 
. For the purposes of discussing identification and without loss of 
generality, rewrite equation (3) as: 
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 The necessary condition to just identify the structural shocks is to impose restrictions on 
six of the elements of A.  The traditional VAR approach to identification is assume the  
Choleski decomposition i.e. the assumption that the A matrix consists of zeros above the 
main diagonal.  We will try to justify these restrictions structurally with the following 
assumptions: 
1) Inflation is predetermined, and thus does not depend on contemporaneous values of the 
unemployment, the Federal funds rate or the T-bill rate forecast dispersion. The 
justification for this assumption is usual sticky wage and price model. With inflation 
predetermined,  0141312 === aaa
2) The unemployment rate is assumed to respond contemporaneously to inflation shocks, 
but not to financial market shocks via the Federal funds rate or the T-bill rate forecast 
dispersion. Hence . 02423 == aa
3) Finally, and with perhaps the least amount of justification, we assume that Fed in 
setting the Federal funds rate, is concerned solely with inflation and unemployment 
shocks, so  . This assumption is tenuous if the Fed responses to increases financial 
market uncertainty, i.e. an increase in forecast dispersion by changing (perhaps 
decreasing) the Federal funds rate. 
034 =a
Discussion of the impulse response functions 
The impulse response functions for VAR discussed above are shown in Figures 3 a to e.   
The graphs in the third row in each figure can be interpreted as the estimated monetary 
policy rule for the full sample period.  Regardless of the forecast dispersion measure, 
positive inflation shocks induce an increase in the Federal funds rate (although not 
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always statistically significant) while positive unemployment shocks result in a 
comparably large and statistically significant decrease in the Federal funds rate.  
Interestingly, Federal funds rate increases in response to a positive shock to T-bill rate 
forecast dispersion one, two and three quarters ahead, while for 4 and 5 quarters ahead 
the Federal funds rate response is essentially zero.  This seems a bit counterintuitive: As 
shown in Table 3, a positive shock to T-bill rate forecast dispersion seems likely to occur 
during a period of financial crisis (such as in the fall of 1998) which induces greater 
uncertainty about future interest rates. These results suggest that controlling for inflation 
and unemployment, such an increase in uncertainty is associated with restrictive 
monetary policy. 
     The graphs in the fourth row of figure 3 a to e, show for the response of the 1 to 5 
quarter ahead T bill rate forecast dispersion for shocks to inflation, unemployment and 
the Federal funds rate.  The initial impact of positive inflation shocks is to increase 
forecast dispersion from 1 to 4 ahead (statistically significant for 2 to 4 quarters ahead). 
Positive unemployment shocks increase T bill rate forecast dispersion after the initial 
impact quarter by more than inflation shocks.  Shocks to the Federal funds rate, initially 
decreases forecast dispersion for the 1 to 3 quarters ahead forecast dispersion, with the 
impact being insignificantly different from zero after the first quarter. Shocks to the 
Federal funds rate have little impact on the 4 and 5 quarters T bill forecast dispersion. 
Overall the VAR results suggest that shocks to inflation, the unemployment rate and the 
Federal funds rate have a temporary impact on forecast dispersions and hence uncertainty 
about future monetary policy. This is consistent with the Fed’s monetary policy 
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transparency being successful in credibly communicating the future stance of monetary 
policy as well as the ultimate goals of monetary policy. 
4. Concluding remarks 
In this paper we first discuss the various sources of uncertainty that play an essential role 
in the formulation and conduct of monetary policy and evaluate the degree of uncertainty 
faced by monetary policy makers. Sources of uncertainty often include the following: 
uncertain economic data, uncertain economic forecasts, uncertainty in model building, 
uncertainty in the transmission of monetary policy and uncertainty due to globalization. 
Information about these various sources of uncertainty is not distributed symmetrically 
between the central bank and economic agents. Our discussion emphasized the 
desirability to eliminate such asymmetry of information between the central bank and 
economic agents by practicing a transparent monetary policy. 
     In the U.S., Fed transparency with respect to policy actions has improved considerably 
over the past 10 years. Beginning in 1994, under the leadership of Chairman Alan 
Greenspan, the Federal Reserve System went through a series of changes in the reporting 
of monetary policy. Prior to February 1994, financial market participants had to guess, 
infer or estimate the current target of the Federal funds rate as well as the likely future 
path of monetary policy.  Starting in February 1994, the post FOMC meeting press 
releases began to signal changes in the Federal funds rate target without explicitly stating 
the target. When no post meeting statement was released this was taken to signal no 
change in the Fed funds target. It is natural to ask whether this increased transparency has 
reduced the uncertainty about future monetary policy. 
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    We investigate the empirical impact of monetary policy transparency using as a proxy 
for the various sources of uncertainty about future monetary policy the forecast 
dispersions for T-bills from the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF). 
     Data plots and sample statistics suggests that the Fed has been successful at reducing 
uncertainty about future monetary policy.  The broader empirical question is what else 
might account for the decline in forecast dispersion other than the increase in the 
transparency of monetary policy. Thus it is necessary to control for that the absolute size 
of the changes in the Federal funds and the occurrence of financial crises when estimating 
the impact of transparency on the forecast dispersion of T-bill. 
     Our findings from the single equation econometric modeling show that the biggest 
impact of the change in monetary policy transparency occurred in 1994 and 1995: the 
forecast dispersions decreased by -20% to -30% of the sample mean for the 1, 2 and 3 
quarter ahead T bill forecasts. The range of the decrease in forecast dispersions is similar 
for the 4 and 5 quarter ahead forecast dispersions, although the estimates are not 
statistically significant. Thus our estimates suggest that controlling for financial/political 
crisis and the absolute value of the change in the Federal funds rate, the changes in 
monetary policy transparency introduced in 1994 and 19995 resulted in a large reduction 
in uncertainty about future monetary policy 1 to 3 quarters into the future.  
     We finally perform structural vector autoregressions (SVAR) to characterize the 
dynamic impact of economic and monetary policy on the T-bill rate forecast dispersion.  
Overall the empirical results suggest that shocks to inflation, the unemployment rate and 
the Federal funds rate have a temporary impact on forecast dispersions and hence 
uncertainty about future monetary policy. This is consistent with the Fed’s monetary 
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policy transparency being successful in credibly communicating the future stance of 
monetary policy as well as the ultimate goals of monetary policy.  In conclusion, the 
empirical findings confirm that Federal Reserve transparency has reduced the uncertainty 
of future monetary policy anticipated by market participants. 
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Table 1: 
Mean of Standard deviation of 3 month T-bill survey forecast 1 to 5 quarters ahead 
Sample STF1 STF2 STF3 STF4 STF5 
81:3 to 93:4  0.328  0.497  0.640  0.868  1.418 
84:1 to 93:4  0.233  0.357  0.502  0.732  1.269 
94:1 to 06:3  0.160  0.248  0.370  0.494  0.826 
95:4 to 06:3  0.159  0.247  0.357  0.477  0.796 
99:3 to 06:3  0.157  0.275  0.384  0.499  0.765 
      
 
Percent change in mean dispersion from 1981:3 to 1993:4 sample: 
Sample STF1 STF2 STF3 STF4 STF5 
94:1 to 06:3 -51.2% -50.1% -42.2% -43.1% -41.7% 
95:4 to 06:3 -51.5% -50.3% -44.2% -45.0% -43.9% 
99:3 to 06:3 -52.1% -44.7% -40.0% -42.5% -46.1% 
Percent change in mean dispersion from 1984:1 to 1993:4 sample 
Sample STF1 STF2 STF3 STF4 STF5 
94:1 to 06:3 -31.3% -30.5% -26.3% -32.5% -34.9% 
95:4 to 06:3 -31.8% -30.8% -28.9% -34.8% -37.3% 
99:3 to 06:3 -32.6% -23.0% -23.5% -31.8% -39.7% 
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Table 2: Sample: 1984:1 2006:3, observations = 91 
 STF1 STF2 STF3 STF4 STF5 
 Mean  0.19  0.30  0.43  0.60  1.02 
 Median  0.16  0.27  0.39  0.51  0.87 
 Maximum  0.85  0.72  0.88  2.59  3.39 
 Minimum  0.06  0.12  0.18  0.24  0.31 
 Std. Dev.  0.12  0.12  0.16  0.34  0.60 
 Sample autocorrelations (standard error = 0.21) 
Lag 1 0.11 0.54 0.40 0.24 0.13 
       2 0.09 0.45 0.48 0.14 0.12 
       3 0.10 0.36 0.35 0.16 0.12 
       4 -0.07 0.27 0.27 0.39 0.31 
      
 Unit root tests*
ADF test statistic 
(probability) 
-8.45 
(0.00) 
-3.84 
(0.00) 
-3.52 
(0.01) 
-2.52 
(0.11) 
-1.90 
(0.33) 
*Augmented Dickey Fuller test with lag length chosen using the Schwartz information 
criterion. 
 
Comments on Table 2: 
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1) The mean, median, minimum and standard deviation of the forecast dispersion 
(standard deviation of forecasts) increases with the forecast horizon. The maximum also 
increases going from the 2 to 5 quarters ahead forecast dispersion. 
2) Unit root tests indicate that the 1 to 3 quarters ahead forecast dispersions are 
stationary. The 4 and 5 quarters ahead forecast dispersions appear to be nonstationary. 
3) The sample autocorrelations indicate that the 1 quarter ahead forecast dispersions are 
serially uncorrelated. Lags 1 to 3 of the 4 and 5 quarters ahead forecast dispersions are 
not serially correlated, while the fourth lag is. However this series is nonstationary. Does 
this make sense? The 2 and 3 quarters ahead forecast dispersions are serially correlated. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table:3 Sample 1984:1 to 2006:3 
Date STF1 STF2 STF3 STF4 STF5 Event 
84:1  0.43 0.57  1.92 Monetary tightening (+26 bps)  
84:2  0.43 0.67 2.59 2.70 Monetary tightening (+87 bps) 
84:3  0.47 0.72 0.98  Monetary tightening (+87 bps) 
84:4 0.36 0.58 0.73 0.96  Monetary ease (-212  bps) 
85:1 0.48 0.72 0.88 0.99 3.39 Monetary ease (-79  bps) 
85:2 0.32 0.59 0.79 1.80 1.89 Monetary ease (-55  bps) 
85:3   0.64  1.75 No change in monetary policy 
85:4   0.59   Monetary tightening (20 bps) 
86:1     2.06 Monetary ease (-28  bps) 
86:2 0.38 0.46    Monetary ease (-90  bps) 
87:1 0.52    1.79 No change in monetary policy 
87:4 0.34 0.52 0.61  1.72 Stock market crash 
89:1   0.59  2.30 Monetary tightening (+97 bps) 
89:2  0.45 0.64  2.17 Monetary tightening (+28 bps) 
89:3  0.47 0.67   Monetary ease (-64  bps) 
90:1   0.69   Monetary ease (-36  bps) 
90:3     2.03 No change in monetary policy 
91:1     2.20 Monetary ease (-132  bps) 
91:2    1.61 1.66 Monetary ease (-56  bps) 
92:1 0.32     Monetary ease (-80  bps from previous quarter) 
92:3 0.57 0.59 0.66   Monetary ease (-50  bps from previous quarter) 
93:2    1.09  No change in monetary policy 
93:3   0.63   No change in monetary policy 
95:1     2.03 Monetary tightening (+64 bps) 
95:3   0.87 0.94  Monetary ease (-22  bps) 
96:1   0.84   Monetary ease (-36  bps) 
97:3 0.85     Asian financial crisis 
98:2    1.05  No change in monetary policy 
98:4 0.32     Russian LTCM crisis, -67 bps ease 
00:1     1.68 Monetary tightening (+37 bps) 
01:1 0.32 0.43    Monetary ease (-88  bps from previous quarter) 
01:2 0.33 0.48    Monetary ease (-127  bps from previous quarter) 
01:4 0.31     Post 9/11, Monetary ease (-136 bps) 
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04:1  0.41    No change in monetary policy 
# of 
spikes 
13 14 17 9 15  
Note2:  
1. Definition of spikes is the mean plus one standard deviation which for the various measures of forecast 
dispersion works out as: , , , , and 
 
31.01 ≥tSTF 42.02 ≥tSTF 59.03 ≥tSTF 94.04 ≥tSTF
62.15 ≥tSTF
2. Monetary tightening or ease is measured as the change in the Federal funds rate from 
the previous quarter. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4a Sample period 1984:1 to 2006:3  (t-statistics in parentheses) 
 Dependent variable:  (mean = 0.19) tSTF1
Constant 0.19 
(7.38) 
0.19 
(10.16) 
0.18 
(7.14) 
0.17 
(9.67) 
0.17 
(8.42) 
0.14 
(9.25) 
tFFRΔ  0.09 
(2.09) 
0.10 
(3.30) 
0.09 
(2.23) 
0.10 
(3.46) 
0.11 
(2.87) 
0.14 
(4.99) 
94D  -0.07 
(-2.11) 
-0.10 
(-3.91) 
    
tFFRD Δ*94  0.03 
(0.52) 
0.06 
(1.34) 
    
95D    -0.06 
(-1.66) 
-0.08 
(-3.30) 
  
tFFRD Δ*95    0.03 
(0.40) 
0.06 
(1.08) 
  
99D      -0.07 
(-1.89) 
-0.04 
(-1.45) 
tFFRD Δ*99      0.04 
(0.62) 
0.01 
(0.15) 
87CRASH  0.14 
(1.85) 
 0.16 
(1.95) 
 0.19 
(2.23) 
ASIAN  0.76 
(9.86) 
 0.76 
(9.55) 
 0.71 
(8.53) 
RUSSIAN  0.12 
(1.61) 
 0.13 
(1.56) 
 0.09 
(1.08) 
NINE11  -0.00 
(-0.00) 
 0.00 
(0.03) 
 0.01 
(0.10) 
2R  0.16 0.61 0.14 0.59 0.15 0.54 
S.E. of reg 0.11 0.08 0.11 0.08 0.11 0.08 
Q statistic       
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Table 4b Sample period 1984:1 to 2006:3  (t-statistics in parentheses) 
 Dependent variable:  (mean =0.30) tSTF2
Constant 0.28 
(13.80) 
0.27 
(13.22) 
0.27 
(13.05) 
0.25 
(12.54) 
0.23 
(13.46) 
0.14 
(9.25) 
tFFRΔ  0.16 
(4.87) 
0.17 
(5.33) 
0.16 
(4.92) 
0.18 
(5.40) 
0.21 
(6.77) 
0.14 
(4.99) 
94D  -0.09 
(-3.15) 
-0.08 
(-2.81) 
    
tFFRD Δ*94  -0.01 
(-0.13) 
-0.01 
(-0.15) 
    
95D    -0.06 
(-2.33) 
-0.06 
(-2.01) 
  
tFFRD Δ*95    -0.02 
(-0.31) 
-0.02 
(-0.32) 
  
99D      0.01 
(0.31) 
-0.04 
(-1.45) 
tFFRD Δ*99      -0.11 
(-1.90) 
0.01 
(0.15) 
87CRASH  0.24 
(2.70) 
 0.25 
(2.78) 
 0.19 
(2.23) 
ASIAN  0.02 
(0.24) 
 0.02 
(0.19) 
 0.71 
(8.53) 
RUSSIAN  0.05 
(0.60) 
 0.05 
(0.57) 
 0.09 
(1.08) 
NINE11  -0.07 
(-0.67) 
 -0.06 
(-0.59) 
 0.01 
(0.10) 
2R  0.46 0.47 0.39 0.42 0.35 0.54 
S.E. of reg 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.08 
Q statistic       
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Table 4c Sample period 1984:1 to 2006:3  (t-statistics in parentheses) 
 Dependent variable: (mean = 0.43) tSTF3
Constant 0.43 
(13.35) 
0.42 
(12.63) 
0.43 
(13.97) 
0.42 
(13.27) 
0.36 
(14.56) 
0.36 
(13.94) 
tFFRΔ  0.16 
(3.15) 
0.17 
(3.28) 
0.15 
(2.99) 
0.16 
(3.12) 
0.22 
(4.85) 
0.23 
(4.93) 
94D  -0.09 
(-2.24) 
-0.09 
(-2.00) 
    
tFFRD Δ*94  -0.05 
(-0.63) 
-0.04 
(-0.46) 
    
95D    -0.10 
(-2.47) 
-0.10 
(-2.23) 
  
tFFRD Δ*95    -0.04 
(-0.46) 
-0.03 
(-0.30) 
  
99D      0.01 
(0.22) 
0.01 
(0.27) 
tFFRD Δ*99      -0.20 
(-2.25) 
-0.21 
(-2.02) 
87CRASH  0.18 
(1.30) 
 0.19 
(1.32) 
 0.24 
(1.67) 
ASIAN  -0.04 
(-0.32) 
 -0.03 
(-0.25) 
 -0.08 
(-0.53) 
RUSSIAN  -0.00 
(-0.03) 
 0.01 
(0.04) 
 -0.10 
(-0.71) 
NINE11  -0.11 
(-0.69) 
 -0.10 
(-0.62) 
 -0.01 
(-0.05) 
2R  0.26 0.25 0.26 0.25 0.22 0.21 
S.E. of reg 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 
Q statistic       
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Table 4d Sample period 1984:1 to 2006:3  (t-statistics in parentheses) 
 Dependent variable:  (mean = 0.60) tSTF4
Constant 0.61 
(8.31) 
0.60 
(7.82) 
 0.59 
(8.44) 
0.58 
(7.98) 
0.52 
(9.14) 
0.52 
(8.75) 
tFFRΔ  0.26 
(2.20) 
0.27 
(2.23) 
0.26 
(2.25) 
0.27 
(2.28) 
0.32 
(3.06) 
0.34 
(3.09) 
94D  -0.15 
(-1.52) 
-0.13 
(-1.23) 
    
tFFRD Δ*94  -0.17 
(-0.92) 
-0.21 
(-1.02) 
    
95D    -0.13 
(-1.40) 
-0.11 
(-1.08) 
  
tFFRD Δ*95    -0.20 
(-1.09) 
-0.27 
(-1.25) 
  
99D      -0.04 
(-0.34) 
-0.02 
(-0.15) 
tFFRD Δ*99      -0.29 
(-1.42) 
-0.37 
(-1.56) 
87CRASH  0.21 
(0.64) 
 0.23 
(0.69) 
 0.28 
(0.86) 
ASIAN  -0.11 
(-0.35) 
 -0.11 
(-0.34) 
 -0.16 
(-0.49) 
RUSSIAN  -0.08 
(-0.23) 
 -0.04 
(-0.11) 
 -0.30 
(-0.93) 
NINE11  0.13 
(0.35) 
 0.21 
(0.56) 
 0.23 
(0.59) 
2R  0.14 0.11 0.14 0.11 0.10 0.09 
S.E. of reg 0.31 0.32 0.31 0.32 0.32 0.32 
Q statistic       
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Table 4e Sample period 1984:1 to 2006:3  (t-statistics in parentheses) 
 Dependent variable: (mean = 1.02) tSTF5
Constant 1.12 
(8.52) 
1.09 
(7.99) 
1.08 
(8.59) 
1.05 
(8.07) 
0.98 
(9.71) 
0.96 
(9.23) 
tFFRΔ  0.33 
(1.55) 
0.36 
(1.67) 
0.33 
(1.63) 
0.37 
(1.75) 
0.42 
(2.26) 
0.47 
(2.48) 
94D  -0.32 
(-1.88) 
-0.30 
(-1.68) 
    
tFFRD Δ*94  -0.23 
(-0.70) 
-0.21 
(-0.58) 
    
95D    -0.29 
(-1.68) 
-0.26 
(-1.46) 
  
tFFRD Δ*95    -0.31 
(-0.94) 
-0.33 
(-0.87) 
  
99D      -0.26 
(-1.38) 
-0.24 
(-1.20) 
tFFRD Δ*99      -0.30 
(-0.83) 
-0.37 
(-0.90) 
87CRASH  0.61 
(1.05) 
 0.65 
(1.12) 
 0.73 
(1.26) 
ASIAN  0.20 
(0.34) 
 0.20 
(0.34) 
 0.02 
(0.03) 
RUSSIAN  -0.40 
(-0.69) 
 -0.33 
(-0.56) 
 -0.80 
(-1.39) 
NINE11  -0.06 
(-0.09) 
 0.09 
(0.13) 
 0.06 
(0.09) 
2R  0.13 0.11 0.13 0.11 0.11 0.10 
S.E. of reg 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.56 
Q statistic       
 27
 
 
 
 
 
 
0
4
8
12
16
20
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
3 month T-bill Rate
(secondary market)
Federal funds rate
Figure 1: Federal funds rate and the 3 month T-bill rate
Correlation = 0.996
 
 28
01
2
3
4
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
0
1
2
3
4
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
0
1
2
3
4
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
0
1
2
3
4
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
0
1
2
3
4
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Figure 2: Standard Deviation of the three month T-bill rate
(Survey of Professional Forecasters)
One quarter ahead Two quarters ahead
Three quarters ahead Four quarters ahead
Five quarters ahead
 
 
 
 29
 Figure 3a 
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 Figure 3b 
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Figure 3c 
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Figure 3d 
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Figure 3e 
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